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A STRATEGIC LEGAL CHALLENGE TO THE UNFORESEEN
ANTICOMPETITIVE AND RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY
EFFECTS OF BASEBALL’S NORTH AMERICAN DRAFT
Stephen F. Ross* and Michael James, Jr.**
INTRODUCTION
Major League Baseball (MLB) has honored a single player by retiring
his number for every club. Absent special commemorations, no player will
wear the number “42” in honor of the man who broke the color barrier to
become the first African American to play major league baseball in the
modern era: Jackie Robinson.1 MLB has also honored a single player—
chosen from nominees from each individual club—by presenting an
annual award for humanitarian service in his name; that honoree is
Roberto Clemente.2 However, the sad reality is that if a fifteen-year-old
Jackie Robinson were growing up today in South Pasadena, California, or
if a fifteen-year-old Roberto Clemente were growing up today in Carolina,
Puerto Rico, there is little chance that either would ever become a
professional baseball player.
Prior to entering the segregated ranks of professional baseball,
Robinson and his American-born peers of all races generally developed
their skills along similar paths. In high school and in college, Robinson
was an exceptional athlete and played four sports: football, basketball,
track, and baseball.3 Similarly, his white Kentuckian teammate on the
Brooklyn Dodgers, Pee Wee Reese, developed his skills in his church’s

*. Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Sports Law, Policy and Research, The
Pennsylvania State University.
**. Member of the New York Bar, formerly Research Fellow, Penn State Institute for
Sports Law, Policy and Research.
1. See Hal Bodley, Retiring No. 42 One of Baseball’s Greatest Moments, MLB.com
(Apr. 11, 2013), http://m.mlb.com/news/article/44514982/retiring-no-42-one-of-baseballsgreatest-moments [http://perma.cc/8F7V-6BVS] (discussing permanent MLB-wide 1997
retirement of Jackie Robinson’s number).
2. See About the Award, MLB Community, http://web.mlbcommunity.org/programs
/roberto_clemente_award.jsp?content=about [http://perma.cc/2DR7-34MN] (last visited
Sept. 9, 2015) (noting Roberto Clemente Award “recognizes those individuals who truly
understand the value of helping others,” and that recipient is selected from pool of thirty, one
from each MLB club).
3. Arnold Rampersad, Jackie Robinson: A Biography 36–55 (1997) (describing
Robinson’s high-school and junior college career, including winning region’s Most Valuable
Player in baseball in 1938).
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amateur league.4 Likewise, Clemente honed his talents in a wellorganized Puerto Rican amateur league and then by signing professionally with a club in the island’s professional winter league.5
Today’s infrastructure for the development of elite baseball talent
has radically changed. In the United States, high-school baseball is no
longer a viable route to pro baseball. Over the years, player development
in North American baseball has become increasingly privatized.
Expensive traveling baseball teams have become an essential part of
youth skill development and the route to pro baseball.6 The result has
been predictable: a decline in participation among poor young men,
disproportionately racial minorities. Today, African American participation in MLB has dropped to 8.05%.7
The lack of external resources to develop young baseball players
whose families cannot afford privatized development is not simply
another aspect of social inequality. The willingness of MLB clubs to invest
substantial private resources in developing young players in the
Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and other countries is strong evidence
that private markets would work in North America as well. MLB clubs
make this investment because they can sign young prospects developed
in team-run Latin American academies to standard minor league
contracts, which can be renewed for up to seven years.8 Conversely, the
Rule 4 draft prohibits any club from signing North American amateurs to
a professional contract unless the player is eighteen-years old and has
been drafted by the club or remains unsigned after a multiple-round

4. Gerald E. Brennan, Harold “Pee Wee” Reese, Notable Sports Figures (2004),
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3407900449.html [http://perma.cc/XSL8-QLFX].
5. Paul Robert Walker, Pride of Puerto Rico: The Life of Roberto Clemente 25–32
(1988).
6. See Tom Verducci, Blackout: The African-American Baseball Player Is Vanishing.
Does He Have a Future?, Sports Illustrated (July 7, 2003), http://www.si.com
/vault/2003/07/07/345871/blackout-the-african-american-baseball-player-is-vanishingdoes-he-have-a-future [http://perma.cc/3NJQ-ZBRY] (noting existence of “instructional
chasm” between young players who can obtain privatized training and those who cannot).
7. Bob Nightengale, African Americans in MLB: 8%, Lowest Since Integration Era,
USA Today: Daily Pitch (Apr. 15, 2012, 7:44 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities
/dailypitch/post/2012/04/mlb-jackie-robinson-day-african-american-players/1#.VPTOU8
b7oz4 [http://perma.cc/N6B7-FSKQ] (“The African-American percentage in baseball this
season has dropped to 8.05%, which is less than half the percentage of 17.25% in 1959 when
the Boston Red Sox became the last team to integrate their roster.”).
8. The structure of the minor leagues and agreements that require minor league
players to sign uniform contracts is discussed in David M. Szuchman, Note, Step Up to the
Bargaining Table: A Call for the Unionization of Minor League Baseball, 14 Hofstra Lab.
& Emp. L.J. 265, 280–83 (1996); see also Minor League Uniform Player Contract (last
updated Oct. 8, 2015) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (depicting current sample
version of contract).
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draft.9 This explains why the Los Angeles Dodgers, New York Yankees,
and Chicago Cubs invest in, respectively, academies at Campo Las
Palmas, Boca Chica, and La Piedra in the Dominican Republic, but not
in their own backyards in South Central, Harlem, or Englewood.10
The racially discriminatory effects of the Rule 4 draft have been
previously demonstrated in an important article by two distinguished
Emory Law professors with sophisticated economic training: Joanna
Shepherd Bailey and George Shepherd.11 They explain how the MLB
rule signiﬁcantly distorts clubs’ incentives.12 Clubs can recoup their
investments in identifying and developing young players outside the
United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico; however, by selecting a player in
the Rule 4 draft, a club can obtain exclusive rights to sign a North
American high school graduate or college junior, regardless of how
much time and effort some other club might have put into developing
that player.13 Professors Bailey and Shepherd document how, as a result
of the draft, clubs signiﬁcantly reduced scouting and development in
North America and shifted development to Latin America.14 For affluent,
predominantly white suburbanites, parental support for private
development replaced the traditional ways in which Jackie Robinson, Pee
Wee Reese, and Roberto Clemente developed their skills.15 Those in the
inner city, predominantly African Americans, have been left out.16
Professors Bailey and Shepherd conclude that the MLB rules constitute a discriminatory employment practice that violates Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 Their solution is to eliminate the draft and
9. First-Year Player Draft FAQ, MLB.com, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/
faq.jsp [http://perma.cc/P4BR-MXBU] (last visited Sept. 9, 2015) (identifying draft
eligibility rules for North American amateurs).
10. Cf. Academies, MLB.com Academies, MLB.com http://mlb.mlb.com/dr/
academies.jsp [http://perma.cc=/V5AD-PTCD] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) (“[E]ach MLB
Club has founded an academy for promising prospects in the Dominican Republic.”).
11. Joanna Shepherd Bailey & George B. Shepherd, Baseball’s Accidental Racism:
The Draft, African-American Players, and the Law, 44 Conn. L. Rev. 197, 216–21 (2011)
(discussing relationship between draft rules, teams’ investment in foreign player
development, and change in racial composition of MLB teams).
12. See id. at 207–12 (“[T]he new [draft] system created powerful incentives that
would lead the teams to abandon the development of U.S. players, to focus on the
development and hiring of foreign players instead, and to slash their hiring of AfricanAmerican players.”).
13. See id. at 210 (“Because [of] the draft and age minimums [for domestic
players] . . . [t]here is a much lower chance that another team will steal away a foreign
player that a team has developed and scouted.”).
14. See id. at 218 ﬁg.1 (depicting reduction in percentages of U.S.-born players on
MLB teams while percentages of Latin-born players rose, from 1947 to 2001).
15. See id. at 231–35 (describing expensive private development including traveling
teams, showcase camps, and private lessons).
16. See id. at 239 (discussing statements by “baseball insiders” who see reduced
investment in scouting and development in inner cities).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
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return baseball player development to a system of free competition for
the services of amateur players, akin to that which now exists in English
professional soccer.18
Although the legal and economic analysis supporting a Title VII
claim is strong, this Essay offers another basis by which the Rule 4 draft
could be challenged and a more modest remedy that has a number of
strategic and legal beneﬁts. It suggests that the Rule 4 draft constitutes an
unreasonable restraint of trade under the Sherman Act and the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The remedy for these antitrust violations could
be narrower than complete abolition of the Rule 4 draft: a tailored
exemption from the draft for players whose economic circumstances
make them unlikely to receive privatized development and who have
been trained and developed by MLB clubs. With such an exemption,
MLB clubs would have the incentive to create domestic academies to
identify and develop prospects who currently have no resources available
for their own development.
There are a number of advantages to a two-pronged strategy seeking
to modify the Rule 4 draft under both civil rights and antitrust legislation. First, those who believe that a draft is an essential tool in avoiding
severe competitive imbalance between rich and poor teams will resist the
draft’s wholesale abolition with far greater strength than they would resist
the modest exemption this Essay proposes. Second, the threat of
successful private antitrust litigation, with its consequent risk of treble
damage liability, may secure a more favorable settlement than if the Rule
4 draft were challenged only under the Civil Rights Act. Third, the
prospect of an investigation by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
could overcome the claim that the draft is protected by the judicially
created baseball antitrust exemption, and the FTC’s procedures are more
amenable to settlement along the lines of this Essay’s proposal.
This Essay articulates the arguments that can be marshaled to
potentially persuade the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
the FTC, or the courts to ﬁnd the Rule 4 draft illegal, or at least to raise
sufficient doubts to motivate MLB clubs to alter their anticompetitive
and antisocial rules. Part I expands upon prior work in demonstrating
how the Rule 4 draft, as applied, discriminates against poor, young
would-be baseball players, particularly inner-city racial minorities. Part II
explains why the Rule 4 draft is an unreasonable restraint of trade.
Finally, Part III rejects arguments as to why the antitrust laws should not
apply to the Rule 4 draft.

18. Bailey & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 203.

2015]

BASEBALL'S NORTH AMERICAN DRAFT

131

I. HOW THE RULE 4 DRAFT UNFAIRLY DISCRIMINATES
AGAINST AFRICAN AMERICAN YOUTH
Professors Bailey and Shepherd argue that the shift to the Rule 4 draft
in 1964 was prompted by two main concerns: a fear that large bonuses to
sign untested rookies were threatening the clubs’ financial security, and the
expectation that rich teams from big cities would systematically sign better
players than less prosperous teams from smaller markets, thus hurting
competition.19 At a time when amateur players faced a Reserve Clause
binding them in perpetuity to the team that signed them,20 and when clubs
were almost entirely dependent on revenues from stadium gate and local
television and radio broadcasts,21 most baseball officials perceived that
unfettered competition for amateur players was a significant factor in the
competitive imbalance that had plagued MLB in the post–war era.22
Relying on thoughtful insights by a veteran MLB scout and a leading
baseball journalist, Professors Bailey and Shepherd explain how external
assistance is essential for elite athletes to hone their skills sufficient to
warrant a professional contract.23 Because the chances that another team
can steal away a foreign player that an MLB club has developed and
scouted are limited, and because a foreign player can be signed younger,
the return on investment in scouting and developing foreign players is
far greater than the return on investing similar effort in young American
ballplayers.24 Predictably, MLB clubs have shifted a huge amount of
resources from scouting and assisting American teens to training and
hiring players not subject to the Rule 4 draft.25 While the draft reduces
the incentive for MLB clubs to invest in scouting and development at
19. Id. at 203–04.
20. The Reserve Clause was challenged under the Sherman Act, but the Supreme
Court held that the claim was precluded by the antitrust exemption for baseball originally
declared by the Court in 1922. See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of
Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1922) (describing baseball games as “purely
state affairs” not subject to federal laws). The National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, known as the National League, and the American League comprise MLB. See
generally, American League (AL), Encyclopedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com
/topic/American-League [http://perma.cc/6NQS-UCDZ] (last visited Sept. 26, 2015)
(explaining history of American League and its partnership with National League).
21. See Michael J. Haupert, The Economic History of Major League Baseball, Econ.
History Ass’n (Dec. 3, 2007), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economic-history-of-majorleague-baseball/ [http://perma.cc/Q6EY-GJUF] (discussing evolution of business of
professional baseball and revenue sources).
22. Indeed, of the twenty-six pennants contested between 1949 and 1963, all but six
were won by the Yankees, Giants, and Dodgers. See World Series Winners and Postseason
History, Baseball-Reference.com, http://www.baseball-reference.com/postseason/ [http://
perma.cc/3P34-JQCU] (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (listing historical playoff results).
23. Bailey & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 207. Indeed, Professors Bailey and
Shepherd entitle this part of their article The Draft’s Unintended Incentives: Hire Foreign, Hire
White. Id.
24. Id. at 210.
25. Id. at 212.
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home, the teams retain a strong incentive to draft and sign “selfdeveloped U.S. players . . . who have received the necessary intensive
development and training during their teen years from sources other
than MLB teams.”26 MLB investment now consists largely of scouts
attending elite competitions that showcase talent for both professional
scouts and college coaches.27
These self-developed players are rarely African American; Professors
Bailey and Shepherd argue that this is because African American families
are more likely to lack the time and resources to participate in the new privatized development infrastructure.28 African Americans disproportionately
reside in “dense urban areas” that “contain few baseball fields.”29 As the
noted journalist Tom Verducci concluded, African Americans “encounter[]
economic and instructional gaps—they don’t have access to the groomed
fields, expert instruction and the pay-for-play mentality associated with
suburbia.”30 With young black players receiving less access to what has
become the only viable development option, black participation in MLB has
plummeted.31
The effect of the Rule 4 draft is starkly illustrated by the case of
Puerto Rico, Clemente’s home. Professors Bailey and Shepherd document the sharp drop (more than forty percent) in MLB players from
Puerto Rico, along with explicit observations from baseball insiders
attributing the change to the 1989 decision to extend the Rule 4 draft to
players from that U.S. commonwealth.32 This effect was recognized by the
Puerto Rican government, whose request for an exemption from the
draft was refused by MLB.33
When MLB owners agreed to the amateur draft in 1964, a viable
infrastructure for the development of young baseball players still existed in
the United States. Players developed through competitions organized by
high schools, the American Legion, and other organizations that were
widely available to different socioeconomic groups.34 While private traveling

26. Id. at 210.
27. Interview with Robert Cooper, Head Baseball Coach, Pa. State Univ., in State
College, Pa. (Nov. 20, 2013).
28. Bailey & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 233.
29. Id. at 234.
30. Verducci, supra note 6.
31. See Nightengale, supra note 7 (discussing dramatic decline in African American
player percentage).
32. Bailey & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 230.
33. Id. at 230–31.
34. See History of American Legion Baseball, The Am. Legion, http://www.legion.
org/baseball/history [http://perma.cc/LWL5-WPDM] (last visited Sept. 9, 2015)
(describing history of American Legion Baseball); see also John Manuel, The History and
Future of the Amateur Draft, Soc’y for Am. Baseball Research, http://sabr.org/research
/history-and-future-amateur-draft [http://perma.cc/B2EE-UJS7] (last visited Sept. 9,
2015) (“Scouts scoured the country, going to games, getting to know players’ families and
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clubs and personal instructors have worked well for many affluent
youngsters and their families, poorer kids have fallen through the cracks.
This is where Rule 4 becomes relevant, by removing the market incentives
that would otherwise exist for MLB clubs to make the kind of investments at
home they routinely make in Latin America.
Like the inner cities and poor rural areas of the United States, there
is no effective infrastructure in Latin American countries such as the
Dominican Republic or Venezuela for schools or other public organizations to train and develop elite young baseball players. However, MLB
clubs have a strong incentive to ﬁll this void and invest in training
programs because they can sign a foreign player whom they have helped
develop. Since the adoption of the Rule 4 draft, major league clubs have
opened roughly sixty baseball academies in Venezuela and the
Dominican Republic.35
MLB owners have recognized the problem, creating a centrally
administered program, Reviving Baseball in Inner Cities (RBI).36
According to its website, MLB and its clubs have devoted $30 million to
the program, which is designed to increase participation and interest in
baseball and softball among underserved youth, encourage academic
participation and achievement, increase the number of talented athletes
prepared to play in college and the minor leagues, promote greater
inclusion of minorities into the mainstream of the game, and teach the
value of teamwork.37 At the same time, MLB clubs have invested $60
million per year in Latin American academies,38 whose sole purpose is to
develop major league talent. It is no surprise, of course, that an MLB
club would be more willing to make an investment in an academy where
it can reap the rewards of its own development efforts than to make an
investment in a collective academy.
Where a developmental infrastructure exists outside the United
States, MLB clubs do not invest in academies. There are no MLB
academies in Mexico, Japan, Taiwan, China, or South Korea, for
example. This is because it is more efficient for clubs to allow professional leagues and clubs in those countries to develop their own players,
and then reach agreements with the clubs or leagues if Mexican,

competing with each other to cultivate the best relationship, make the best offer, and sell
their organization as the most attractive one for an up-and-coming ballplayer.”).
35. Bailey & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 201.
36. See Max Ferregur, For the Love of Baseball: The MLB RBI Program, SI Kids:
Blogs (Aug. 18, 2014, 12:56 PM), http://www.sikids.com/blogs/2014/08/18/for-the-loveof-baseball-the-mlb-rbi-program [http://perma.cc/V2K5-88FU] (discussing RBI program
and its goals).
37. About Reviving Baseball in Inner Cities, MLB.com, http://mlb.mlb.com/
mlb/official_info/community/rbi_facts.jsp [http://perma.cc/NA4H-K9SX] (last visited
Oct. 17, 2015).
38. Bailey & Shepard, supra note 11, at 215.
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Japanese, Taiwanese, Chinese, or Korean players demonstrate skills
sufficient to play at the MLB level.39
For aspiring baseball players from affluent families, private commercial entities have ﬁlled the vacuum created by the decline of the
infrastructure of American baseball development. A recent news article
detailed the $8,000 batting cage installed in the backyard of a 12-year-old
so he could make a top traveling team.40 Some families can spend up to
$24,000 annually on tournaments, lessons, and equipment.41
The confluence of the disappearance of traditional American player
development infrastructure, the rise of expensive privatized player development, and the differing rules governing North American and Latin
American prospects has had a discriminatory effect on North Americans
without access to either expensive private player development or wellfunded MLB academies. Antitrust law presents a potential solution to the
problem.
II. ANALYZING THE RULE 4 DRAFT UNDER
ANTITRUST LAW’S RULE OF REASON
The Sherman Act prohibits agreements that unreasonably restrain
trade. The Rule 4 draft is appropriately characterized as an agreement
among the thirty MLB clubs not to sign an amateur player in North America
unless they have selected the player in an annual draft (or unless the player
is not selected by any team at all). The antitrust question is thus whether this
restriction is unreasonable. Part III discusses whether a judicially created
exemption for baseball would preclude antitrust scrutiny of the Rule 4 draft.
Because that question cannot be answered without an understanding of how
the antitrust laws apply to sports, this Part presents an antitrust analysis
before the subsequent Part takes up the exemption question.
A.

Rule of Reason Applies

In NCAA v. Board of Regents,42 the Supreme Court set forth the
standard that governs sports-league trade restraints. The Rule 4 draft,
like the television restrictions adopted by the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) that were challenged in Board of Regents, is an
39. See Anthony Witrado, MLB International Signing Rules Must Be Altered with
Improved US-Cuba Relations, Bleacher Rep. (Dec. 22, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/
articles/2307450-mlb-international-signing-rules-must-be-altered-with-improved-us-cubarelations [http://perma.cc/EU5C-WEXC] (discussing Mexican and Asian player development systems as options for Cuba).
40. Amy Shipley, Moneyball Jr.: Baseball for Minors Looks a Lot Like the Majors, Sun
Sentinel (Mar. 16, 2013), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2013-03-16/news/fl-moneyball-jr20130317_1_bidding-wars-travel-ball-team-south-florida-stealth [http://perma.cc/GV6E-FY5K].
41. Id.
42. 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984) (holding NCAA television plan “is inconsistent with the
Sherman Act’s command that price and supply be responsive to consumer preference”).

2015]

BASEBALL'S NORTH AMERICAN DRAFT

135

agreement among entities that would otherwise compete with each
other: what antitrust law calls “horizontal agreements.”43 The Court
noted that the antitrust laws have traditionally presumed that certain
types of agreements among competitors are unreasonable, yet have
recognized that competing sports teams must agree among themselves
on certain issues that are essential for the product to be available at all.44
Thus, sports-league rules that restrain trade are not “illegal per se,” but
are subject to antitrust scrutiny under a “rule of reason.”45 According to
Board of Regents, the “essential inquiry” is “whether or not the challenged
restraint enhances competition.”46 Board of Regents requires that, once a
plaintiff has demonstrated a signiﬁcant anticompetitive effect from a
sports league’s rule, the league must present a procompetitive justiﬁcation for its owners’ agreements.47 If the league satisfies this burden, the
plaintiff can show that the restraint is not reasonably necessary or that the
defendant’s objectives could be achieved by less restrictive alternatives.48
The lower courts have consistently recognized that labor-market restraints are within the reach of the antitrust laws without any proof of a
direct effect on some downstream-product market.49 Thus, there is no basis
43. See id. at 99 (deﬁning horizontal restraint as “agreement among competitors on
the way in which they will compete with one another”).
44. Id. at 101. Although Justice John Paul Stevens’s empirical statement is not
required to justify the Court’s conclusion, and Rule of Reason treatment is accepted as
binding law for purposes of this Essay, his statement is not technically accurate. Horizontal
agreement among MLB clubs would not be necessary were the sport organized like
NASCAR with an independent competition organizer setting rules that MLB clubs would
follow in a vertical relationship with MLB, Inc. See Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski,
Antitrust and Inefficient Joint Ventures: Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like
McDonald’s and Less Like the United Nations, 16 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 213, 216 (2006)
(suggesting “[e]ntertainment in the form of competitive sports leagues can be produced
through a structure in which coordination of the particulars . . . is provided by a separate
entity that is distinct from the clubs participating in the competition”).
45. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100–04.
46. Id. at 104.
47. Id. at 113 (“Under the Rule of Reason, these hallmarks of anticompetitive behavior
place upon petitioner a heavy burden of establishing an affirmative defense which
competitively justifies this apparent deviation from the operations of a free market.”).
48. See id. at 119 (discussing alternatives to NCAA television plan and ﬁnding plan
was “not . . . tailored to serve” league’s interest in competitive balance).
49. See, e.g., Roman v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 542, 544 (10th Cir. 1995) (“‘Just as
antitrust law seeks to preserve the free market opportunities of buyers and sellers of goods,
so also it seeks to do the same for buyers and sellers of employment services.’” (quoting 2
Phillip Areeda & Herbert Hoevencamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 377c (rev. ed. 1995))); Powell v.
NFL, 930 F.2d 1293, 1298 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1989) (recognizing league rule restraining
competition within player services market is subject to antitrust law); Smith v. Pro Football,
Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183–89 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding NFL draft is “undeniably
anticompetitive in both its purpose and in its effect”); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 616–
18 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding “restraints on competition within the market for players’
services fall within the ambit of the Sherman Act”); Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402,
407–08 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J., concurring) (ﬁnding Anti-Trust Acts prohibit restraint
that “unreasonably forbids any one to practice his calling”); see also Law v. NCAA, 902 F.
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to exclude labor markets from the “Magna Carta of free enterprise.”50
Indeed, in light of the social policy expressed in the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), which acknowledges the unequal distribution of
bargaining power between workers and employers, it can hardly be thought
that federal policy should permit employer conspiracies that restrain
competition and exacerbate this disadvantage.51 In sum, there is no basis for
failing to apply the general rule for sports leagues established in Board of
Regents to the specific labor-market restraints implicated by a league’s
adoption of a blanket restraint like that imposed by the Rule 4 draft.
B.

The Rule 4 Draft Constitutes a Restraint of Trade

From a practical perspective, firms can restrain trade only when
consumers cannot turn to providers of reasonable substitutes. Where firms
do not possess “market power,” any would-be conspirators cannot exploit
consumers or suppliers by adopting anticompetitive restrictions; if they
attempt to, “market retribution will be swift.”52 With regard to the market
for player development, there are no reasonable substitutes and market
retribution will not be swift. There are no businesses, other than MLB
clubs, with a financial incentive to develop low-income players for free in
return for the possibility of signing players to pro contracts. In addition,
the Rule 4 draft results in fewer poor athletes playing baseball than would
otherwise be the case, resulting in unfulfilled potential and a lower quality
of baseball. Were there a rival baseball league, it might have an incentive to
develop inner-city players to compete for the patronage of baseball fans.
However, there is no alternative for MLB consumers to substitute.53
C.

The Only Legitimate Antitrust Justiﬁcation Is Competitive Balance

In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court set out the analytical framework for sports-league agreements, establishing a two-part test to
examine a league’s justiﬁcations once a plaintiff had established the

Supp. 1394, 1402, 1405 & n.11 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding collegiate athletic association rule
ﬁxing salaries for coaches violates section 1 of Sherman Act).
50. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws in
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise.”).
51. Lee Goldman, The Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws as Applied to
Employers’ Labor Market Restraints in Sports and Non-sports Markets, 1989 Utah L. Rev.
617, 625–26 n.33 (citing NLRA to demonstrate Congress acknowledged disparate
bargaining power). For related arguments as to why the common law should treat
employer conspiracies to restrain trade more harshly than worker restraints in the labor
market, see generally Stephen F. Ross, The Evolving Tort of Conspiracy to Restrain Trade
Under Canadian Common Law, 75 Can. Bar Rev. 193 (1996).
52. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Imps., Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Posner, J.).
53. See Laumann v. NHL, 56 F. Supp. 3d 280, 291–94 (S.D.N.Y 2014) (discussing
baseball’s historical exemption from antitrust law).
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existence of a signiﬁcant restraint on competition.54 The Court’s test
inquires, ﬁrst, whether a league’s purported justiﬁcations are legitimate
and, second, whether the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve that
league’s goals.55 The Court concluded that the NCAA’s imposition of
signiﬁcant restrictions on the sale of television rights was not reasonably
tailored to promote equalized competition.56 Thus, a competitive-balance
justiﬁcation was inapplicable in that case.
The Court’s opinion correctly suggests, however, that the rule of reason
would allow owners to enter into agreements having the effect of
significantly restricting competition in the player market, if the result was a
promotion of competitive balance that resulted in an overall increase in the
output of the “product.”57 In context, this means an increase in fan appeal
as reflected in greater attendance, more television viewers or digital subscribers, and so forth.58 In a similar vein, in McNeil v. NFL, District Judge
David Doty instructed the jurors that, if they found that the free agency
restraints at issue substantially harmed competition in the bidding for player
services, the burden would then shift to the league to show that the restraints were “reasonably necessary” to achieve competitive balance.59
McNeil illustrates the key requirement of reasonable tailoring. In that
case, the jury found that National Football League (NFL) labor market
restraints did promote competitive balance, but they were impermissibly
overbroad.60 Similarly, the Rule 4 draft was initiated to counteract the
superior ability of wealthier clubs to attract and acquire superior players.
This disparity in player acquisition was a detriment to the competitive
balance throughout the league.61 The draft order is determined based on
the previous season’s standings, with the team possessing the worst record

54. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113–17.
55. Id. In applying that test to the facts of the case, the Court wrote: “Petitioner
argues that the interest in maintaining a competitive balance among amateur athletic
teams is legitimate and important and that it justiﬁes the regulations challenged in this
case. We agree with the ﬁrst part of the argument but not the second.” Id. at 117.
56. Id. at 119.
57. See id. at 117 (contrasting challenged rule with permissible procompetitive rules,
which contain some amount of cooperation necessary to preserve public interest in
intercollegiate athletics).
58. See Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812, 818 (D. Minn. 1988) (Doty, J.) (concluding
“danger that destruction of the competitive balance could ultimately lead to diminished
spectator interest and franchise failures itself constitutes a sufficient basis” for denying
preliminary relief that would have created complete free agency in football).
59. No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 315292, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1992).
60. Id. at *1.
61. Although cause and effect are hard to determine, in the fifteen years prior to the
Rule 4 draft, the New York Yankees were American League champions for thirteen years,
while in the fifteen years following the draft the New York Yankees have won only three
American League championships. See New York Yankees Team History and Encyclopedia,
Baseball-Reference.com, http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/NYY/ [http://perma.cc
/RHV8-ADTM] (last visited Sept. 10, 2015) (listing historical playoff results).
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receiving the first pick.62 This structure is designed to aid low-performing
teams in acquiring better talent. However, because many superior players
are often farmed from overseas academies, the effect of the draft is
significantly diminished. As no justification other than enhancing
competition has been seriously asserted for the Rule 4 draft, and no court
has recognized another justification for labor market restraints,63 the
legality of the Rule 4 draft under the antitrust law will turn on its necessity
to promote competitive balance.
D. The Rule 4 Draft Is Unnecessarily Restrictive in Applying to Economically
Disadvantaged Amateurs Who Are Unable to Provide for Their Own
Professional Development
Although the Rule 4 draft is supposed to aid low-performing teams in
acquiring better players through the draft, the fact that it is limited to
North American players substantially mitigates any procompetitive effects.
Rule 4 has no effect on the ability of teams with superior capital resources
to acquire better talent overseas. MLB rules do not meaningfully limit
investment in player development overseas, so the Rule 4 draft places a
disproportionate burden on the American labor market. Moreover, since
the draft’s adoption in 1966, MLB has adopted extensive revenue-sharing
programs to promote competitive balance between clubs with vastly
different revenues; were domestic training academies encouraged, additional limits on club investment could be adopted to minimize any appealreducing effect on competitive balance. On two occasions, the NFL’s
amateur draft has been found illegal because “it went beyond the level of
restraint reasonably necessary to accomplish whatever legitimate business
purposes might be asserted for it.”64 Likewise, the Rule 4 draft’s application
to underprivileged players developed by clubs in domestic academies
would appear to be overly restrictive.

62. First-Year Player Draft Rules, MLB.com, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday
/rules.jsp [http://perma.cc/B3YL-SZRG] (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
63. See Stephen F. Ross, The NHL Labour Dispute and the Common Law, The
Competition Act, and Public Policy, 37 U.B.C. L. Rev. 343, 359–68 (2004) (considering and
rejecting other theoretically plausible policy justiﬁcations for restraining competition in
labor markets).
64. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also Kapp v.
NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff’d, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978) (using basic
antitrust reasonableness test to hold NFL draft rule “patently unreasonable”). In the
decision below, the district court had similarly held that it “need not fully evaluate the
league’s claims of necessity for a college draft because, even conceding the need for some
such system, the current structure is signiﬁcantly more restrictive than necessary.” Smith v.
Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 746 (D.D.C. 1976), rev’d 593 F.2d 1173 (1988). For the
NFL draft to be found lawful under the rule of reason, the judge said he would have to
ﬁnd that the draft “is a reasonable way of pursuing legitimate business interests, and that it
does not have the purpose or effect of unreasonably restraining competition.” Id. at 745.
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In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., the D.C. Circuit first questioned the degree
to which the draft accomplished the goal of competitive balance at all.65 The
court expressed the view that the key to competitive balance in the NFL was
not the amateur draft but the equal sharing of network television revenues.66
The court also suggested that the effect of the amateur draft paled in comparison to the impact of the head coach on the success or failure of the
team, noting that over a three-year period the same nine teams occupied
twenty-two of the available twenty-four playoff spots, and at least six of them
included successful veteran coaches.67 Thus, “the player draft does not have
an equalizing effect to the extent of knocking out the top teams, if the top
teams have good coaches.”68 The court concluded that “the effects of fine
coaching swamp whatever effect the draft may have on team performance.”69 Turning to overbreadth, the court noted that the league justified
the draft “primarily by the need to disperse the best players,” but the
restraint “applied to all graduating seniors, including average players who
were, in a sense, fungible commodities.”70 The court suggested several less
restrictive alternatives to allocate amateur talent among NFL clubs.71 Most
significantly, the court noted that the “least restrictive alternative” would be
the elimination of the draft and the use of revenue sharing to equalize
teams’ financial resources.72
As a whole, players beneﬁt if reasonable restrictions result in a better
product that produces more revenue, especially where the labor market
is sufficiently unrestrained so that owners will devote much of the
increased revenue to higher salaries. Fans beneﬁt because overly broad
restrictions diminish the quality of the product. Overly restrictive labor
market rules frustrate supporters of teams with inferior talent, who want
65. 593 F.2d at 1183 n.46 (ﬁnding NFL’s theory of competitive balance to be “legally
wide of the mark in a rule of reason inquiry”).
66. See id. at 1184 n.46 (“[T]wo other factors contribute at least as much as the
player draft to producing and maintaining a competitive balance in the league—television
revenues and coaching changes.”).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1187 (emphasis omitted).
71. See id. at 1187–88. These alternatives included a scheme that would permit
several teams to draft a player and limit the number of players any one team might sign;
league rules that set minimum acceptable terms that a team must offer to a drafted player
lest they lose their exclusive rights; a second draft if a player did not come to terms with
the team initially drafting him; or a sharply limited draft that would cover only the top
players. Id. See generally, Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports
Fans, Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev. 519, 555–80 (discussing less
restrictive means of promoting competitive balance, including revenue sharing and
progressive salary caps).
72. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188. The court in Kapp v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73, 82 (N.D. Cal.
1974), aff’d, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), concluded without elaboration that the
perpetual allocation to one team of exclusive negotiating rights to a drafted player was
overbroad.
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their teams to improve quickly, and sports fans generally respond more
favorably to exciting seasons where teams are competitively balanced.73
As illustrated by Board of Regents, those who would justify an
agreement that substantially restrains trade, as the Rule 4 draft does, must
bear a “heavy burden” to justify the arrangement.74 The question is not on
the viability of the Rule 4 draft itself, but specifically on the possibility that
clubs that invest in the training and development of poor teenage players
receive an exemption from the draft for those players. It may be difficult
for MLB owners to demonstrate that any amateur draft is necessary to
maintain a level of competitive balance preferred by fans, but it seems
particularly far-fetched to suggest that—with adequate revenue sharing or
other alternatives—competitive imbalance would significantly increase if
MLB gave its clubs a modest exemption for poor players whose skills they
develop in domestic academies. Indeed, small-market teams might well be
more likely to take advantage of this exemption than large-market clubs
that can afford to simply acquire high-priced free agents. This suggests that
the application of the restrictions of the Rule 4 draft to a domestic
“academy” would be found to be an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of the Sherman Act.
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF ANTITRUST LAW TO THE RULE 4 DRAFT
The analysis in Part II demonstrates that if the Rule 4 draft were
subjected to typical antitrust scrutiny, courts would likely ﬁnd that it constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade, at least to the extent that it
precludes MLB clubs from signing products of domestic academies who
otherwise would be unlikely to receive elite baseball development.
However, defenders of the unmodiﬁed, anticompetitive, and discriminatory Rule 4 draft can raise substantial claims that the draft is not
subject to typical antitrust scrutiny. First, because the claim relates to
restraints in a labor market, and is referenced in the collective
bargaining agreement between MLB clubs and the MLB Players
Association (MLBPA), they will claim that the “nonstatutory labor
73. Economists Henry Demmert and Roger Noll have independently demonstrated
empirically that attendance increases when teams are equally matched and game
outcomes are uncertain. See Henry G. Demmert, The Economics of Professional Team
Sports 10–11 (1973) (dividing teams into “Good” and “Poor” teams based on record and
comparing attendance); Roger G. Noll, Attendance and Price Setting, in Government and
the Sports Business 115, 156–57 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974) (ﬁnding leagues beneﬁt from
decreasing variance in team quality). Others have correctly pointed out that competitive
balance is only one feature that makes a professional sports league attractive to fans. For
example, minor leagues with high rates of player turnover enjoy more long-term
competitive balance than the major leagues but have less spectator appeal. Michael J.
Trebilcock, The Common Law of Restraint of Trade 226 (1986). Amenities, ease of access
to stadiums, availability of substitute forms of sporting or other entertainment, weather,
and income also affect attendance. See Noll, at 115–20 (describing factors inﬂuencing
demand for games).
74. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113 (1984).
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exemption” precludes antitrust review. Second, they will claim that the
judicially created “baseball exemption” still applies to preclude judicial
review of trade-restraining agreements in our national pastime. This Part
demonstrates that neither exemption precludes review.
The nonstatutory labor exemption applies only to labor market
restraints that are mandatory subjects of bargaining under federal labor
law.75 As we detail below, the Rule 4 draft is not a mandatory subject of
bargaining with major-league players, and minor-league players are not
organized and engaged in collective bargaining. Moreover, the baseball
exemption should no longer be construed to preclude antitrust scrutiny.
Even if it were not overruled, the reasoning behind its most recent
affirmance in 1972 does not preclude a challenge to the Rule 4 draft by the
FTC, which is authorized to issue prospective-only cease and desist orders.
A.

Labor Exemption

The Sherman Act was designed to protect individuals “from the evils of
accumulated corporate wealth and power in all markets,” including labor
markets.76 In 1926, the Supreme Court recognized the validity of an antitrust
complaint from a seaman challenging the cartel system of registration for
employment agreed to by virtually all Pacific Coast ship owners.77
In 1935, Congress enacted the NLRA as an alternative means of
allowing workers to fairly bargain in the face of the corporate power of
employers.78 The NLRA encouraged workers’ chosen unions and employers to agree collectively on wages, hours, and working conditions of
employment.79 The Supreme Court has recognized that to effectuate the
NLRA requires an “accommodation” of antitrust and labor law.80 In
Mackey v. NFL, the Eighth Circuit held that a trade restraint embodied in
collective bargaining agreements was exempt from antitrust challenge
when its principal effect was on the labor market and when it concerned
a “mandatory subject of bargaining” under federal labor law.81

75. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 625 (8th Cir. 1976).
76. Lee Goldman, The Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws as Applied to
Employers’ Labor Market Restraints in Sports and Non-Sports Markets, 1989 Utah L. Rev.
617, 623 (recounting legislative history of Sherman Act).
77. See Anderson v. Shipowners Ass’n, 272 U.S. 359, 365 (1926) (holding cartel
system “in violation of the Anti-Trust Act”).
78. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (“The inequality of bargaining power between
employees . . . and employers . . . substantially burdens and affects the ﬂow of commerce,
and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions . . . .”).
79. See id. § 158(d) (listing “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment” as mandatory subjects of negotiation).
80. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676, 689 (1965) (discussing process of “accommodating the coverage of the Sherman Act
to the policy of the labor laws”).
81. 543 F.2d 606, 614–15 (8th Cir. 1976) (“The labor exemption presupposes a
violation of the antitrust laws. To hold that a subject relating to wages, hours and working
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The Eighth Circuit’s principle was extended in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,
when a class of 235 “developmental squad” players brought an antitrust suit
against an agreement among the NFL clubs to pay them a uniform $1,000
weekly salary.82 The NFL argued that this agreement, unilaterally implemented after an admitted impasse in bargaining with the NFLPA, was
protected by the nonstatutory labor exemption.83 Labor law precedents
require a multi-employer bargaining group (like NFL clubs) to refrain from
instituting new policies relating to mandatory subjects of bargaining, even if
necessary to conform to antitrust law, without bargaining in good faith with
the union; only at impasse did the employer’s duty to bargain temporarily
cease, and only then could an employer unilaterally make changes comprehended within its most recent proposal.84 The Supreme Court held that “the
postimpasse imposition of a proposed employment term concerning a
mandatory subject of bargaining” is shielded from the antitrust laws by the
nonstatutory labor exemption.85 Under this standard, the NFL’s agreement
was protected by the nonstatutory labor exemption. The Court explained
that the “conduct took place during and immediately after a collectivebargaining negotiation . . . [and] [i]t involved a matter that the parties were
required to negotiate collectively.”86
The judicially created exemption’s accommodation of labor and
antitrust law is grounded in the potential conflict between an employer’s
labor law duty to bargain in good faith regarding mandatory subjects and
their potential antitrust law duty to avoid unreasonable agreements
restraining competition in labor markets.87 This conflict does not arise with
regard to employer agreements that are not mandatory subjects of
bargaining, so there is no reason for employers not to conform their
conduct to the antitrust laws with regard to these topics. The Rule 4 draft is
not a mandatory subject of bargaining between MLB clubs and the MLBPA.
In several decisions, labor arbitrators have held that MLB must
negotiate with the MLBPA over the terms of the Rule 4 draft. However,
these arbitral precedents make clear that the basis of the obligation is not
the NLRA’s requirement to bargain over mandatory subjects, but the
specific language of baseball’s collective bargaining agreement. In
Grievance 92-3, MLB sought to alter the draft by extending the time in
conditions becomes nonmandatory by virtue of its illegality under the antitrust laws
obviates the labor exemption.”). What constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining is a
major issue in labor law, involving judicial and National Labor Relations Board precedents
in determining what falls under the statutory deﬁnition of “wages, hours, and working
conditions.” National Labor Relations Act, 5 U.S.C. § 71 (1978). See generally N. Peter
Lareau, Labor and Employment Law § 12.05(3)(b) (2008).
82. 518 U.S. 231, 235 (1996).
83. Brief for Respondents at 9, Brown, 518 U.S. 231 (No. 95-388), 1996 WL 71820.
84. See Brown, 518 U.S. at 235–38 (explaining history and logic behind rule).
85. Id. at 238.
86. Id. at 250.
87. Id. at 234.
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which a club had exclusive rights to drafted players.88 The Arbitrator
expressly noted that, although extensive testimony “questioned the
fairness of these amendments to amateur players” and “witnesses debated
the effect the amendments might have on college baseball programs,” the
issue “did not turn on those considerations but was contractual, i.e.,
whether the amendments violated the Basic Agreement.”89 The Arbitrator
found a breach of the agreement, because an MLB club that signed a
major league player ranked in the top 30% of his position group was liable,
under the agreement, to compensate the player’s former team with a draft
pick.90 The Arbitrator reasoned that a change in the Rule 4 draft that
made draft picks more valuable (by extending their duration) would
therefore affect the bargained-for ability of veteran MLB players in the
ensuing competition for their services.91 Because the Basic Agreement
expressly required MLB to negotiate with the MLBPA over changes that
would result in “a change in a Player benefit under an existing rule,” MLB
could not implement a change in the Rule 4 draft that increased the value
of a draft choice.92 The Arbitrator expressly declined to rule on the labor
law question of whether Rule 4 draft changes were mandatory subjects of
bargaining, relying on the contract language for the result.93 In a
subsequent decision, the same arbitrator specifically addressed this point:
[I]t makes no difference, of course, whether the draft rules are
a mandatory or only a permissive subject of bargaining.
Whatever Board law may be with respect to the basis for ﬁnding
an unfair labor practice, the Clubs . . . have no “contractual”
right to change a subject of bargaining by amendment of the
Major League Rules, even if that subject is permissive. The
reason is that they surrendered any such right when they
agreed . . . not to enact changes “inconsistent” with agreements
already made.94
The principles enunciated in Brown v. Pro Football Inc. should not
extend to the Rule 4 draft, for several reasons. By eliminating competition for the services of amateur players, Rule 4 has a direct and
substantial impact on the wages and working conditions of those players;
the draft would clearly be a mandatory subject of bargaining between
88. In re Major League Baseball Players Ass’n and the 28 Major League Clubs,
Grievance 92-3; Amateur Draft (Aug. 19, 1992). Rule 4 had provided that if a player
drafted upon high school graduation enrolled in college, the club would lose their draft
rights. MLB clubs sought to change the rule to extend exclusive rights for ﬁve years.
89. Id. at 4.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 15 (“What cannot be seriously disputed is that those free agents subject to
compensation will carry a greater burden in negotiations by virtue of the change.”).
92. Id. at 5.
93. Id. at 18.
94. See In re the Major League Baseball Player’s Ass’n and the Thirty Major League
Clubs, Grievance 97-21, 21 (May 18, 1998) (quoting Decision No. 96 (Amateur Draft II)
(Nicolau, C.)).

144

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:127

MLB clubs and minor league players if they voted to collectively
bargain.95 Would the National Labor Relations Board really tolerate a
refusal by MLB to bargain with minor league players without the MLBPA,
who owes no duty to represent minor league players, present at the table?
If the agreement with the MLBPA did not have a speciﬁc reference to
rookie draft picks as compensation, it is difficult to envision the
argument that major league players would have a statutory right to
bargain about it. Returning the focus to the principal issue here—
whether the labor exemption should extend to the Rule 4 draft—the
argument would seemingly permit a union and management to extend
signiﬁcantly the scope of immunity, simply by including terms in a
collective bargaining agreement that reference some other labor market.
There is no indication that Brown permits any such thing.
Even where a subject is a mandatory subject of bargaining under the
labor law, the nonstatutory exemption does not apply to restraints where
the primary effect is not in the labor market. To illustrate, consider the
provision in a 1970s National Hockey League (NHL) collective bargaining agreement that precluded NHL players from providing their
services to another league for three years after the expiration of their
NHL contract. Surely, this provision is a mandatory subject of bargaining
with NHL players under labor law. However, the district court struck
down the provision, holding that the labor exemption did not apply
because the principal effect was to impair interleague competition
between the NHL and the rival World Hockey Association.96 The nonstatutory exemption should therefore not preclude a challenge by the
government or plaintiffs who are not parties to the Basic Agreement: The
primary effect of the Rule 4 draft—and, in particular, the refusal of MLB
clubs to exempt players trained in domestic academies from the draft—is
not in the labor market that is organized, MLB players, but in another
discrete labor market—non-MLB players.
B.

Baseball Exemption

On three occasions since 1922, the Supreme Court has held baseball
exempt from private treble damage actions under the Sherman Act. The
first of those occasions occurred when the Baltimore Terrapins, a member
of the Federal League that operated as a major league from 1914 to 1915,
sued the National and American Leagues, claiming that the established
leagues had conspired to unlawfully impair the rival Federal League’s
95. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating “mandatory subjects
of bargaining pertain to ‘wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment’”
(quoting National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012))); see also, NLRB v.
Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (“[I]t is lawful [to] insist
upon matters within the scope of mandatory bargaining and unlawful to insist upon
matters without . . . .”).
96. Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 500
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
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ability to sign players.97 In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, the Court held that games were
intrastate events since the travel from one state to another was “not the
essential thing,” although there was scheduling of games across state
lines.98 Thus, under the contemporary, narrow definition of the scope of
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, the Sherman Act did
not apply.99 This decision was reaffirmed again in 1953,100 and 1972101, with
the Court emphasizing the principle of stare decisis.
An extensive debate about whether the Court should overrule these
later decisions, and overturn Federal Baseball, which the Court itself has
admitted is an “exception and an anomaly,”102 exists within judicial
decisions103 and the academic literature.104 The arguments in favor of
97. Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 207 (1922) (noting plaintiff alleged defendants “conspired to monopolize the base
ball business”).
98. Id. at 209.
99. Id. (affirming lower court’s holding that defendants were not within Sherman Act
because conduct was “not an interference with commerce among the States”).
100. See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (affirming lower
court’s judgments on basis of Federal Baseball’s authority).
101. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–85 (1972) (affirming lower court’s
judgments on basis of Federal Baseball’s and Toolson’s authority).
102. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282.
103. Compare McCoy v. MLB, 911 F. Supp. 454, 456–58 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (holding
exemption applies to business as a whole due to Congress’s inaction to eliminate antitrust
exemption), with Piazza v. MLB, 831 F. Supp. 420, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting baseball
exemption only applies to Reserve Clause limiting competition for players). For other
cases limiting the exemption, see, e.g., Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball
Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021, 1025 (Fla. 1994) (same). For cases applying the exemption more
broadly, see, for example., MLB v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (arguing
exemption applies to “business of baseball” and not just reserve system); Prof’l Baseball
Sch. & Clubs, Inc. v. Kuhn, 693 F.2d 1085, 1085–86 (11th Cir. 1982) (ﬁnding variety of
matters beyond reserve system “integral” to baseball business and thus exempt). Most
recently, the exemption was reaffirmed in the context of franchise relocation in City of
San Jose v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686, 692 (9th Cir. 2015). In
part, the Ninth Circuit found itself bound by a prior circuit precedent applying the
exemption beyond the Reserve Clause. Id. at 689 (“Under the baseball exemption, we
have rejected an antitrust claim that was wholly unrelated to the reserve clause.” (citing
Portland Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 491 F.2d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 1974))).
104. See, e.g., Robert G. Berger, After the Strikes: A Reexamination of Professional
Baseball’s Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 209, 226 (1983)
(characterizing exemption as “aberration in antitrust interpretation”); Nathaniel Grow,
Deﬁning the “Business of Baseball”: A Proposed Framework for Determining the Scope of
Professional Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption, 44 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 557, 591 (2010)
(arguing future courts should reject prior lower court approaches to scope of exemption);
Gary R. Roberts, Sports League Restraints on the Labor Market: The Failure of Stare
Decisis, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 337, 340 n.7 (1986) (“[I]t is doubtful that the Court would
reaffirm the exemption or, if it did, that Congress would not legislate the exemption out of
existence.”); Stephen F. Ross, Reconsidering Flood v. Kuhn, 12 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L.
Rev. 169, 171–72 (2004) (arguing for antitrust scrutiny of baseball business)[hereinafter
Ross, Reconsidering Flood] .
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overturning it are persuasive. Furthermore, the Curt Flood Act of 1998,105
which partially overruled the exemption for major league players, does
not signal that courts should maintain the exemption. More importantly,
even accepting the Court’s reasoning, the FTC should declare the Rule 4
draft to be illegal as an unfair method of competition.106
When the Supreme Court considered Toolson v. New York Yankees in
1953, it was clear that under any application of settled doctrine, the business
of baseball constituted interstate commerce subject to congressional regulation.107 As the Court acknowledged in Flood v. Kuhn, Toolson identified four
new reasons that, in the Court’s view, justified reaffirming baseball’s special
exemption: (a) Congress’s “positive inaction”108; (b) MLB’s reliance on the
exemption; (c) a concern with the retroactive effect of Sherman Act (treble
damage) liability; and (d) a “professed desire that any needed remedy be
provided by legislation rather than by court decree.”109 In the end, Justice
Blackmun described his judgment as part of a line of cases where “‘it was
concluded that more harm would be done in overruling Federal Baseball than
in upholding a ruling which at best was of dubious validity.’”110
The case for overruling Flood is strong. A precedent can justiﬁably be
overturned when it becomes outdated and after being “‘tested by
experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or
with the social welfare.’”111 One reason for overruling a precedent is that
“the intervening development of the law has ‘removed or weakened the
105. Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2012); see also infra text accompanying
notes 124–129.
106. Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, makes unfair methods of competition
unlawful. Although the scope of section 5 is broader than the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1–7, conduct which is an unreasonable restraint of trade is a fortiori an unfair method
of competition.
107. See 346 U.S. 356, 357–58 (1953) (Burton, J., dissenting) (noting majority’s opinion
following Federal Baseball is contrary to any reasonable understanding of contemporary facts
and law). Federal Baseball was decided during the so-called Lochner era where the Supreme
Court sharply limited the scope of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. Most
relevant was the decision in United States v. E.C. Knight Co. holding the Sherman Act
inapplicable to the acquisition of virtually all the sugar refineries in Philadelphia because
“manufacturing” was not “commerce.” 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895). Federal Baseball’s view that the
playing of baseball games was intra-state commerce was consistent with this holding. After the
New Deal, the Supreme Court overruled this doctrine, holding that Congress’s power
included the ability to regulate intrastate activities with a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (upholding regulation of
home-grown wheat). Consistent with the modern approach, the Court later explicitly
concluded that it would not “return[] to the Knight approach.” Mandeville Island Farms, Inc.
v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948).
108. 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972).
109. Id. at 274; see also id. at 279 (claiming legislation rather than court decision is
“‘more likely to protect the industry and the public alike’” (quoting Radovich v. NFL, 352
U.S. 445, 452 (1957))).
110. Id. at 278 (quoting Radovich, 352 U.S. at 450 ).
111. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting
Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 150–52 (1921)).
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conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision.’”112 When it decided
Flood, the Court believed that requiring clubs to compete under the
antitrust laws could damage the sport.113 In 1972, no professional sports
league had succeeded while allowing vigorous competition for players’
services. Three years after Flood, a grievance arbitration interpreting the
standard player contract gave players the same relief that Curt Flood had
sought under the Sherman Act.114 The owners and the players’ union
responded by reaching a collective bargaining agreement.115 Under this
agreement, the Reserve Clause was substantially modiﬁed.116
The years since Flood have demonstrated that the Court’s concerns
there were unfounded. The competition for players resulting from
developments in labor law has improved the sport: Attendance at baseball
games rose significantly from 1975 to 1985,117 and the value of baseball
franchises has skyrocketed.118 Moreover, the excessive restrictions on
competition that have been allowed to escape antitrust scrutiny have
increased labor strife: Eight collective bargaining agreements were negotiated only after a strike or a lockout.119 Finally, the methodology set forth
in NCAA v. Board of Regents would both preserve the desirable practices
112. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996) (quoting Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)).
113. Cf. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283 (expressing “concern about the confusion and the
retroactivity problems that inevitably would result with a judicial overturning of Federal
Baseball”).
114. Twelve Clubs Comprising Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs & Twelve Clubs
Comprising Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, L.A. & Montreal Clubs v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.) (noting standard
player contract permitted club to unilaterally renew contract for one year only and after
one year, player was free agent eligible to be signed by any club).
115. Paul C. Weiler et al., Sports and the Law 284 (4th ed. 2011). Were baseball subject
to the Sherman Act, this agreement would be exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the
labor exemption. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 234 (1996) (noting
“implicit antitrust exemption that applies where needed to make the collective-bargaining
process work”).
116. Players with six years of major league service became “free agents,” able to sell
their services to the highest bidder; players with two years of experience could submit
salary disputes to an independent arbitrator. See Timothy R. Hylan, Maureen J. Lage &
Michael Treglia, The Coase Theorem, Free Agency, and Major League Baseball: A Panel
Study of Pitcher Mobility from 1961 to 1992, 62 S. Econ. J. 1029, 1029–30, 1037 n.24
(1996) (discussing shift from Reserve Clause to free agency and arbitration eligibility).
117. See Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 643, 676 (1989)
(noting 57% increase in attendance in years following elimination of Reserve Clause that
limited competition for players).
118. Anthony Baldo, Secrets of the Front Office: What America’s Pro Teams Are
Worth, Fin. World, July 9, 1991, at 25, 30 (quoting consultant reporting 1970s and 1980s
saw baseball, football, and basketball franchise values enjoy annual compounded increase
of twenty percent to twenty-ﬁve percent). Granted, television revenues may have been the
primary cause of increased franchise revenues, but this franchise-value increase
nevertheless casts doubt on claims that competition for players hurts baseball.
119. See Ross, Reconsidering Flood, supra note 104, at 170–71 (discussing developments since Flood).
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now employed by MLB and promote consumer–fan interests by barring
anticompetitive agreements in a workable manner.
Beyond the stare decisis rationale, Flood based its decision not to
abolish baseball’s exemption on Congress’s awareness of the exemption
and its refusal to act.120 The Court regarded Congress’s refusal to repeal
the exemption as tacit approval of the Reserve Clause that Curt Flood
was challenging.121 Indeed, on two separate occasions, each congressional chamber passed legislation that would have effectively legalized
the Reserve Clause and other anticompetitive practices, only to have the
bills die in the Judiciary Committee of the other House.122 Flood was clear
that attaching weight to legislative inaction demanded “something more
than mere congressional silence and passivity.”123 The legislative record
since Flood reveals more than silence and passivity: Congress considered
affirming the exemption and decided not to.
If principles the Court uses to reconsider outmoded precedents
suggest that the baseball exemption should be overruled, nothing in the
Curt Flood Act of 1998 reﬂects Congress’s desire to shield MLB from a
narrow antitrust claim against the application of the Rule 4 draft to
underprivileged youth. The Curt Flood Act repealed baseball’s antitrust
exemption in a limited respect, allowing current major league players to
ﬁle antitrust suits against MLB.124 Speciﬁcally, 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a) of the
Act permits players to ﬁle antitrust suits “to the same extent such
conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust
laws if engaged in by persons in any other professional sports business,”
but only so long as the lawsuits related to or “affect[ed] employment of
major league baseball players.”125 Further, § 26b expressly limits the Act,
providing that “[n]o court shall rely on the enactment of this section as a
basis for changing the application of the antitrust laws to” a variety of
matters, including litigation initiated by amateur or minor league players
or “any other matter relating to organized professional baseball’s minor
leagues.”126
Indeed, the Curt Flood Act’s legislative history reveals that Congress
did not intend for the statute to adopt or reject any of the conﬂicting

120. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 273–74 (1972) (discussing congressional
inaction).
121. Id. at 283 (citing Congress’s “positive inaction” that was “something other than
mere congressional silence and passivity”).
122. Stephen F. Ross, The Story of Flood v. Kuhn: Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, At
the Time, in Statutory Interpretation Stories 36, 47–51 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., eds.
2011).
123. Flood, 407 U.S. at 283.
124. Curt Flood Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 26b(c) (2012).
125. Id. § 26b(a).
126. Id. § 26b(b).
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interpretations of the exemption’s scope post–Flood.127 Speciﬁcally,
during the Senate’s deliberation over the bill, Senator Paul Wellstone
noted that some courts had recently narrowed the scope of the baseball
exemption and asked for conﬁrmation that the Curt Flood Act would not
affect these precedents.128 In response, the bill’s cosponsors, Senators
Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy, conﬁrmed that the Act was “intended to
have no effect other than to clarify the status of major league players
under the antitrust laws. With regard to all other context or other
persons or entities, the law will be the same after passage of the Act as it
is today.”129 Although strong political support for minor league baseball
played a role in congressional consideration, minor league baseball
would in no way be jeopardized by allowing MLB clubs to sign underprivileged youth trained in a domestic academy to a standard minor
league contract.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit grievously misinterpreted legislative intent
in its reasoning in concluding that Flood remained applicable to franchise
relocation issues. In City of San Jose v. Office of the Commissioner of Baseball,130
the court ignored this clear legislative history and reasoned that Congress’s
decision in the 1998 Curt Flood Act to partially override Flood v. Kuhn with
regard to major league players131 signaled congressional intent that the
Supreme Court should adhere to Flood with regard to other aspects of the
baseball exemption.132 The Flood Act itself states that it does not create an
antitrust claim regarding franchise relocation,133 and further that courts
shall not “rely on the enactment of this section as a basis for changing the
application of the antitrust laws to any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements other than those” relating to major league baseball players.134 As
noted in the legislative history, the clear legislative intent was to overrule
Flood v. Kuhn partially, while leaving the rest of the exemption subject to

127. See 144 Cong. Rec. S9621 (daily ed. July 31, 1998) (statements of Sens. Wellstone,
Hatch, and Leahy).
128. See id. (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
129. See id. (statements of Sens. Hatch and Leahy); see also J. Philip Calabrese,
Recent Legislation, Antitrust and Baseball, 36 Harv. J. on Legis. 531, 537 n.46 (1999)
(summarizing same); Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust Options to Redress Anticompetitive
Restraints and Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues, 52 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 133, 161 n.90 (2001) (same). The quoted statements made on the Senate ﬂoor are
consistent with the Senate Judiciary Committee report, which stated that the bill was
drafted so it “would not implicate issues or actions other than those speciﬁed in
[§ 26b(a)]. Thus, [§ 26b(b)] makes explicit the Committee’s intent that the passage of this
bill does not affect the applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws in any other
context beyond that speciﬁed in [subsection (a)].” S. Rep. No. 105-118, at 6 (1997).
130. 776 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 2015).
131. Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824 (codiﬁed as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 26b).
132. City of San Jose, 776 F.3d at 691.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 26b(b)(3).
134. Id. § 26b(b).

150

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 115:127

the same standards of stare decisis that courts regularly use.135 If the Ninth
Circuit’s approach were widely followed, it would severely impair
Congress’s ability to respond in a nuanced fashion to judicial precedents;
the Ninth Circuit’s approach makes it much more difficult for Congress to
partially respond to judicial decisions, while allowing other precedents to
be evaluated by later courts as they would be without any congressional
intervention.
As noted previously, Flood expressed a preference for prospective
legislative abrogation of the exemption.136 Perceiving its choices as limited to
overruling Toolson and subjecting MLB to full Sherman Act liability or
allowing Congress to pass prospective-only legislation, the majority
explained its preference for its chosen course by noting that legislation
would avoid issues of retroactivity, procedurally could be more inclusive than
adversarial antitrust litigation, and substantively might be more flexible than
Sherman Act scrutiny.137 Even if today’s Justices were to reject the claim that
developments in the past five decades justify overruling Flood and were to
embrace Justice Blackmun’s preference for an alternative to judicial removal
of the antitrust shield, another way to serve the public interest would be to
subject baseball’s practices to the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Both Radovich and Flood expressed a concern that Sherman Act
scrutiny would involve only litigants, while any legislation dealing with
anticompetitive practices in baseball should feature hearings including
all stakeholders. In the words of Justice Blackmun:
We, therefore, conclude that the orderly way to eliminate error
or discrimination, if any there be, is by legislation and not by
court
decision.
Congressional
processes
are
more
accommodative, affording the whole industry hearings and an
opportunity to assist in the formulation of new legislation. The
resulting product is therefore more likely to protect the
industry and the public alike. The whole scope of congressional
action would be known long in advance and effective dates for
the legislation could be set in the future without the injustices
of retroactivity and surprise which might follow court action.138
The FTC has the statutory authority to investigate the business and
consumer effects of the Rule 4 draft by conducting hearings that could
resemble congressional hearings. The Commission may prosecute any
inquiry necessary to its duties in any part of the United States and may
“investigate . . . the organization, business, conduct, practices, and
management of any person, partnership, or corporation engaged in or
whose business affects commerce?139 Although the “business of baseball”
enjoys antitrust immunity, Flood expressly recognized that baseball was
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See supra note 127 and accompanying text (noting Act’s legislative history).
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972).
Id. at 279 (citing Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 450–52 (1957)).
Radovich, 352 U.S. at 450–52.
15 U.S.C. § 46(a).
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interstate commerce,140 which allows the FTC to exercise jurisdiction over
its business practices.
Commission hearings could precede any formal law enforcement
proceeding against MLB for commission of an unfair method of
competition under the FTC Act. These hearings would not only provide
the sort of inclusive participation that Justice Blackmun envisioned but
would also allow Congress ample time to act on its own to legislate with
regard to baseball practices, if it so chose.
Both Flood and Toolson also expressed concerns about the retroactive
effect of a judicial decision and its resultant harm.141 Unlike the Sherman
Act, which permits treble damage liability to those injured by antitrust
violations, the FTC would almost certainly tailor its remedial power to a
cease and desist order requiring MLB to modify the Rule 4 draft to
permit clubs to develop underprivileged players.
There are a number of reasons why courts should no longer
preserve the anomalous antitrust exemption for baseball. However, even
if the judiciary sees ﬁt to leave Flood undisturbed, its reasoning fully
permits antitrust scrutiny by the FTC.
CONCLUSION
The Rule 4 draft was adopted in the 1960s as a means to address
baseball owners’ perceptions that unfettered competition in signing
amateur players was contributing to competitive imbalance in baseball,
and resulting in unduly high wages for unproven young players.142 At the
time, the infrastructure of youth sports allowed most American teenagers
with athletic skills—rich, poor, black, or white—to develop baseball skills
and, if their talent warranted, secure selection in the draft. Today, that
infrastructure has disappeared. Like Dominicans, underprivileged North
Americans cannot rely on public or generally available sources to develop
baseball skills. Unlike Dominicans, underprivileged North Americans
cannot rely on investment by MLB clubs in training elite players.
140. See 407 U.S. at 258, 269, 273, 275, 279, 285 (discussing “business of baseball”).
Another investigative tool, available in both competition and consumer protection matters,
empowers the Commission to require the filing of “annual or special” reports or “answers in
writing to specific questions” for the purpose of obtaining information about the
“organization, business, conduct, practices, management, and relation to other corporations,
partnerships, and individuals” of the entities to whom the inquiry is addressed. 15 U.S.C. §
46(b). The Commission’s § 6(b) authority further enables it to conduct “wide-ranging
economic studies that do not have a specific law enforcement purpose” and to “obtain
answers to specific questions as part of an antitrust law enforcement investigation.” Fed.
Trade Comm’n, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law
Enforcement Authority (July 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement
-authority#N1 [http://perma.cc/A865-TM5K]. The Commission’s authority would allow it to
investigate the business of baseball proactively. Id.
141. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 283–84 (adhering to Toolson’s reasoning).
142. Bailey & Shepherd, supra note 11, at 216–21.
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The discriminatory and anticompetitive effects of the Rule 4 draft
on poor North American youth can be addressed by a modiﬁcation that
would exempt from the draft those young players unable to provide their
own privatized development, where an MLB club steps in to train and
develop the player. The failure of MLB clubs to modify the Rule 4 draft
constitutes discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and an unreasonable restraint of trade
under the antitrust laws. To the extent that courts may reject private
litigation under the Sherman Act attacking the unmodiﬁed draft, the
FTC should use its unique practices and issue a prospective cease and
desist order requiring the Rule 4 draft’s modiﬁcation.
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